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CONGLOMERATES AND BUSINESS
COMPETITION: AN INTRODUCTION
IRVING LIPKOWITZ*

The conglomerate issue is as diversified as the conglomerates themselves
often are. The variety of subjects covered in this Symposium is impressive
proof of that fact. No simple analysis or solution is likely to prove satisfactory under these circumstances, especially since much of the controversy
over conglomerates has added confusion rather than clarity to the picture.
This introduction makes no effort to do more than offer a business
economist's approach to the economic data and analyses made available by
this Symposium. As I see it, the basic question to be answered in the area
of economics is this: What impact do conglomerates actually make on business competition?
By "business competition" I do not mean any theoretical or textbook
formulation. As used here, business competition refers to the day-to-day
market place experience of (a) suppliers trying to sell their products or services to prospective purchasers, and (b) buyers trying to decide how much
of their business they should give to what suppliers.
Granted that there is no simple or generalized across-the-economy answer to the question raised here. In this post-moonshot era, the complexity
of the answer is no longer an acceptable defense for ignoring a relevant
question and surely the actualities of marketplace competition are most
relevant to antitrust policy and philosophy. At issue here is whether reliance
should be placed aity longer on the innuendoes of structural data or whether
the focus should be on direct readings of marketplace conditions which
empirical data and analyses would provide.
Concentration ratios illustrate the problem with structural data. They
are used extensively in discussions of various kinds of mergers, including
those involving conglomerates. They have been employed usually to imply
the deterioration or low level of competition in an industry or market.
Based as they are on traditional industrial classifications or market definitions, they tell us less and less about the state of actual marketplace competition as companies, industries and markets change. Technological change
has long been eroding the usefulness of industrial classifications in defining
areas of competition. A number of the participants in this Symposium, who
differ widely on antitrust policy and on conglomerates, are nevertheless in
general agreement on what technology is doing to familiar market concepts
and patterns:
Corwin Edwards-The boundaries of markets are being obscured as a
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consequence of the increasing size of firms and the development
of technology.'
L. E. Birdzell - New product technology frequently ignores existing
market patterns. The electronic and chemical industries are extreme
- but not unique - examples of the impossibility of keeping techwithin the bounds of any definable historic
nological competence
2
product markets.
Werner Sichel - The term "competition" is meaningless unless related to
a particular market and it is the relevant market that must be ascertained. We are accustomed to using "industries" to separate our
markets and only seldom realize how very unsatisfactory and arbitrary these boundaries are.
[T]he modern corporation is simply defying our old industry classifications. The activities of many of our leading corporations increasingly
range over a wide area. I believe the conglomerate merger data in
Part I might look very different if we were to abandon many of the
Bureau's industry classifications and substitute some of the following:
the energy industry, the aero-space industry, the resources industry,
the communications industry, the amusement or leisure-time industry, the transportation industry, and the consumer-branded products
industry.3

The President's Task Force on Productivity and Competition, 4 headed by
George J. Stigler, characterized the "definition of the market," on which
concentration ratios are based, as "so loose and unprofessional as to be
positively embarrassing."
Even if the problem of establishing realistic market definitions were
to be solved, there would still be the need to get beyond the generalities of
concentration ratios. Staff studies of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability5 declared that "[m]arket concentration is directly related to the intensity of competition in an industry." Jules Backman's paper in this Symposium makes the point that "[b]ig Fours in highly concentrated industries may
compete among themselves with a vigor and intensity that is as great, if not
greater, than the competition found in industries much less concentrated.
The existence of some degree of concentration is not equivalent to the absence of competition." Those of us who work directly with individual industries know that no one yardstick is a reliable barometer of competitive
conditions in all or even in most industries these days. While I see corroboration of Jules Backman's position in individual instances, no generalization would be valid. There is no short-cut statistical formula for determining the state of competition in an industry. It can be determined only by
direct examination of market conditions.
1See p. 416 infra.
2 See p. 300 infra,
3 See pp. 362, 364 infra.
4 1969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODucenrlVY AND COMPETITION, 115 CONG.

Rc. 6472 (daily ed. june 17, 1969).
5 STUDIES BY THE STAFF OF THE CABINET COMMITrEE ON PRICE STABILITY 54

S See p. 127 infra,
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The tendency to look elsewhere, rather than at marketplace conditions,
in appraising competition, is evident also in the disputes over reciprocity
and cross-subsidization, and general arguments on each side of these issues
are persuasive and logical to their respective adherents. Here again, the
first step should be a look at what really happens in the marketplace, instead of being preoccupied with speculations as to what could or could
not happen.
With reference to the emphasis being placed on macro or aggregate
concentrations, based on statistics which lump together the 100 or 200 largest manufacturing companies, there is need to explore the relevance of such
data to questions of competition. J. Fred Weston, in his contribution to
this Symposium, offers an explanation of the increase in conglomerate mergers in terms of the increased pace of technological change, shortened product cycles and developments in management technology7 If empirical data
for the industries he mentions and for other industries substantiate his
analysis, then the implications of aggregate data on the largest firms are
unjustified. Here again, general debate over this new kind of concentration
data gets nowhere. They are meaningful, economically speaking, if there is
basis for the notion that either an economy-wide anticompetition conspiracy exists among these largest firms or that their very size precludes any
kind of competition among them. But thus far there are only insinuations,
not information. Again, the need here is for specifics, not logical abstractions.
At the risk of being accused of generalizing myself, it seems to me that
there is too much of a tendency, in the words of Jules Backman, to equate
"potentiality with actuality," in dealing with the conglomerate issue. If, as
I suggested at the outset, the focal point should be the impact on business
competition, top priority in economic debate and analyses should be given
to the determination of what the competitive situation is, not to speculations as to what it could be.
7See

p. 66 infra.

